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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL ASSET
MARKETS AND MACROECONOMIC DYNAMICS
by
TUAN HOANG DAO
Dissertation Committee:
FABIO GHIRONI (chair)
PETER IRELAND
GEORG STRASSER
This dissertation examines the macroeconomic dynamics under different interna-
tional asset market structures. The dissertation consists of two chapters. The first
chapter is my cowork with Taesu Kang, a classmate of mine at Boston College, de-
partment of economics. We investigate the dynamics of the U.S and emerging Asian
countries during the financial crisis in 2008. We focus on the bank lending channel as
the source of shock transmission and explain how the internal default in the U.S can be
transmitted to emerging Asian countries. The second chapter of my thesis is my work
on the international equity home bias and Backus Smith puzzles. I propose a model
with a incomplete asset market, endogenous labor supply and non-tradable goods that
can generate a high degree of home equity bias, even when the domestic human capital
return and equity return are highly correlated. My model also generates a very low
correlation between the consumption differential across countries and the real exchange
rate. The correlation is more inline with data than the strongly positive correlation
predicted by a standard complete asset market framework.
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Chapter 1: International Financial Business Cy-
cles (with Taesu Kang)
1.1 Abstract
Recent international macroeconomics literature on global imbalances explains the
U.S.’ persistent current account deficit and emerging countries’ surplus, i.e., the U.S.
is the borrower. Little research has been done on the banking-sector level, where U.S.
banks are lenders to banks in emerging countries. We build a two-country framework
where banks are explicitly modeled to investigate how lending in the banking sector
can affect the international macroeconomy during the recent crisis. In the steady state,
banks in the developing country borrow from the U.S. banks. When the borrowers in the
U.S. pay back less than contractually agreed and damage the balance sheet of the U.S.
banks, with the presence of bank capital requirement constraint, U.S. banks raise lending
rates and decrease the loans made to U.S. borrowers as well as banks in the developing
country. The results are a sharp increase in the lending spread, a reduction in output
and a depreciation in the real exchange rate of the developing country. This is the
experience of many emerging Asian markets following the U.S. financial crisis starting
in late 2007. Another feature of our model captures an empirical fact, documented
by Devereux and Yetman (2010), that across different economies, countries with lower
financial ratings can suffer more when the lending country deleverages.
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1.2 Introduction
International macroeconomics literature on global imbalances explains why the
U.S. runs a persistent current account deficit. While the U.S. is the net borrower at
the country level, at the banking-sector level, this is not necessarily the case. U.S.
banks and banks in other developed economies are net lenders to banks in emerging
Asian markets (EAM). In around late 2007 or the begining of 2008, when losses in the
mortgage market began to damage U.S. banks’ balance sheets (Figures 1 and 2), U.S.
banks deleveraged and reduced deposits and credits (Figure 3). Not only did they con-
tract loans made to U.S. borrowers, they contracted loans made to foreign borrowing
banks as well. Figure 4 documents external (cross-border) assets of banks in developed
economies and Figure 5 documents external liabilities of banks in EAM. With the ex-
ception of Japan, which was little exposed to U.S. Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS),
all major developed economies showed significant contractions in banks’ external assets,
which resulted in significant contractions in EAM banks’ external liabilities.1 The docu-
mented contraction in international inter-bank lending was followed by a worldwide drop
in GDP growth, both among the developed world (Figure 6) and the developing world
(Figure 7). This empirical evidence highlights the importance of the banking system in
international transmission of shocks.
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. was characterized by decline in asset prices,
disruption in the loan market, sharp increase in interest rate spread and a large drop in
GDP. One thing many scholars have agreed is the banking system played a vital role in
this crisis. There are a number of recent working papers that include bank in a closed
economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to model the recent
crisis in the U.S.: Kiyotaki and Gertler (2010), Iacoviello (2010), a series of papers
by Ali Dib (2010) and others. Recent development in international macroeconomics
literature investigates the effect of the financial linkage that spread the U.S. mortgage
crisis worldwide. Devereux and Yetman (2010) and van Wincoop (2011) build interna-
tional portfolio models where leveraged investors in one country hold the financial asset
in the other country. Consequently, any shock that affects the domestic country asset
1Kamin and DeMarco 2010 document that the majority of foreign exposure to U.S. MBS are of
European Banking Centers.
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prices will affect foreign investors’ balance sheets and spread to the foreign economy.
Ueda (2010), Kollman (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2011) build
international business cycle models with banks. In these papers, entrepreneurs in two
countries share a common lender(s). Any shock that hits one economy will affect the
common lender(s) and thus, its (their) borrowers. While both of these features can be
true among the developed world, i.e., U.S. and the Euro Area, they are not the best
to describe the recent crisis for the EAM. Contrary to the large portfolio position of
European banks in U.S. MBS, banks in EAM have no or very little exposure to the U.S.
MBS and firms in these countries have little direct access to foreign bank credits.
We would like to build a two country model with the banking system that plays an
important role in international transmission of shock, which has been largely agreed to be
the main cause of the recent crisis. Our model is built upon the closed economy version
in Iacoviello (2010). In steady state, banks in the developing country (EAM/domestic
country) borrow from banks in the developed country (the U.S./foreign country). When
some borrowers in the U.S. pay back less than contractually agreed, with the presence
of capital requirement constraint, U.S. banks cut back on lending to U.S. borrowers as
well as EAM banks and raise the inter-bank lending rate. Domestic banks now face
more expensive and less available foreign credit, and will reduce loans made to domestic
borrowers. The financial (repayment) shock in the U.S. is transmitted across country
via the banking system.
In another exercise, we investigate the behavior of the model under permanent
and temporary shocks to the weight of domestic bank loan in the foreign bank’s capital
requirement constraint. The permanent shock can be interpreted as a change in bank
regulation, such as moving from Basel I to Basel II. A temporary shock can be inter-
preted as an exogenous drop in domestic banks’ credit ratings. The results for these
shocks are reductions in home output, investment and consumption and a depreciation
of home real exchange rate.
Our paper is related to a number of empirical papers on global banking. Peek
and Rosengren (1997) study the behavior of Japanese banks in the U.S.. During the
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financial crisis in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Japan, Japanese banks in the U.S.
substantially contracted the amount of loans made to U.S. borrowers. Cetorelli and
Goldberg (2008) document that ”foreign lending activity of U.S. bank affiliates abroad
can rely less on the overall strength of the home office in times of tighter monetary
condition in the U.S.”. Popov and Udell (2010) find that financial distress by West
European and U.S. parent banks has a significant impact on the availability of business
loans for East European firms. Most recently, Imai and Takarabe (2011) use the data
from nationwide and local banks in Japan to test whether banking integration plays an
important role in transmitting financial shocks across geographical boundaries. They
found that nation-wide banks do indeed transmit financial shocks originated from ma-
jor cities to smaller local economies. The results of our model under different weights
of interbank loan in the capital requirement constraint suggests that across countries,
lower-rated economies will suffer more when U.S. banks deleverage. This is consistent
with empirical evidence for the recent crisis, documented by Devereux and Yetman
(2010).
1.3 The Model
There are two countries: the domestic country (EAM) and the foreign country
(U.S.).1 In each country, there are five types of agents: patient households, impatient
households, entrepreneurs, firms and banks. There are two sectors in the economy: the
tradable and non-tradable good sectors.
Both patient and impatient households (HHs) work for firms in tradable and non-
tradable sectors. They earn wage income and consume tradable goods, non-tradable
goods and housing. Patient HHs supply deposits for banks and earn a return from the
deposits. Impatient HHs, on the other hand, borrow from banks to consume. They can
only borrow up to a fraction of the value of their collateral (house).
Domestic bankers take the deposit from domestic depositors and can also bor-
row in the international inter-bank market. They can only borrow up to a fraction of
1The model is built upon Iacoviello (2010) closed economy model
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the value of their capital. They pay a return for the fund they borrow and lend it to
domestic borrowers for a higher return. Foreign bankers take the deposit from foreign
depositors. They lend out to foreign borrowers and domestic bankers. Domestic and
foreign bankers face capital requirement constraint.
Entrepreneurs accumulate physical capital used in both tradable and nontrad-
able sectors. They finance their investment with income from capital rental and bank
loan, which is subject to a collateral debt constraint.
Firms in the tradable and nontradable sectors use capital and labor to produce
goods. They pay wages to HHs.
1.3.1 Consumption Basket
Consumers’ consumption aggregate is given by: ct =
[
(cNt )
ω−1
ω + (cTt )
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
,
where cTt and c
N
t are tradable and non-tradable consumptions. The corresponding price
index is Pt =
[(
PNt
)1−ω
+
(
P Tt
)1−ω] 11−ω
, where P T and PN are the tradable and non-
tradable price indices. The consumption aggregate and price indices for the foreign
economy are identical. We denote the price of non-tradabe (tradable) relative to the
price of consumption baskets as pNt (p
T
t ).
1.3.2 Patient HHs
A continuum of domestic patient HHs deposit dt, consume composite good cp,t and
housing hp,t, and supply labor to tradable, n
T
p,t, and nontradable, n
N
p,t, sectors. They earn
wage income and return from their deposits. They maximize the infinite sum of utilities:
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max
cp,t,hp,t,nNp,t,n
T
p,t,dt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtp
[
ln cp,t + ν lnhp,t + τp ln(1− nNp,t − nTp,t)
]
,
subject to the budget constraint:
cp,t + dt + qt∆hp,t = Rd,tdt−1 + wNp,tn
N
p,t + w
T
p,tn
T
p,t (1)
where Rd,t is the return from the deposits and qt is the price of a house. w
T
p,t and w
N
p,t
are wages from the tradable and nontradable sectors respectively. Their first order con-
ditions are:
1
cp,t
= βpEt
(
Rd,t+1
cp,t+1
)
, (2)
qt
cp,t
=
ν
hp,t
+ βpEt
(
qt+1
cp,t+1
)
, (3)
wNp,t
cp,t
=
τp
1− nNp,t − nNp,t
, (4)
wTp,t
cp,t
=
τp
1− nNp,t − nTp,t
. (5)
Foreign patient HHs’ optimization problem are identical and indexed with *.
1.3.3 Impatient HHs
Domestic impatient HHs also consume goods and housing, and supply labor.
ci,t, hi,t, n
N
i,t, n
T
i,t are impatient HHs’ consumptions, houses, labor supply to the trad-
able and nontradable sectors. Unlike patient HHs, however, they borrow money from
banks, li,t, to finance consumption. They pay interest Ri,t on the loan and can only
borrow up to the value of their houses. Their maximization problem is:
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max
ci,t,hi,t,nNi,t,n
T
i,t,li,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βti
[
ln ci,t + ν lnhi,t + τi ln(1− nNi,t − nTi,t)
]
,
subject to the budget constraint:
ci,t + qt∆hi,t +Ri,tli,t−1 = li,t + wNi,tn
N
i,t + w
T
i,tn
T
i,t, (6)
and the borrowing constraint:
li,t ≤ miEt
(
qt+1hi,t
Ri,t
)
. (7)
Foreign impatient HHs’ problem is equivalent, except that in their budget con-
straint, there is a repayment shock. Their budget constraint is:
c∗i,t + q
∗
t∆h
∗
i,t +R
∗
i,tl
∗
i,t−1 − t
= l∗i,t + w
N∗
i,t n
N∗
i,t + w
T∗
i,t n
T∗
i,t .
As in Iacoviello 2010, t is a mean zero, AR(1) shock that captures the exogenous
repayment shock in the U.S.. When t is greater than 0, U.S. impatient HHs pay back
less than their debt obligation.
First order conditions of impatient HHs are:
7
1ci,t
= λi,tRi,t + βiEt
(
Ri,t+1
ci,t+1
)
, (8)
qt
ci,t
=
ν
hi,t
+ λi,tmiEt(qt+1) + βiEt
(
qt+1
ci,t+1
)
, (9)
wNi,t
ci,t
=
τi
1− nNi,t − nTi,t
, (10)
wTi,t
ci,t
=
τi
1− nNi,t − nTi,t
. (11)
λi,t is the Lagrangian multiplier of impatient HHs’ borrowing constraint.
1.3.4 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs’ optimization problem is:
max
ce,t,kNt ,k
T
t ,le,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βte ln ce,t,
subject to the budget constraint:
ce,t + k
N
t + k
T
t +Re,tle,t−1 +
φk
2
(
∆kNt
)2
+
φk
2
(
∆kTt
)2
= le,t + (r
N
k,t + 1− δ)kNt−1 + (rTk,t + 1− δ)kTt−1, (12)
and the borrowing constraint:
le,t ≤ me(kNt + kTt ). (13)
where ce,t is entrepreneurs’ consumption. k
N
t , k
T
t are entrepreneurs’ capital in the trad-
able and nontradable sectors. They finance investment with income from capital rental
in the two sectors rNk,t + 1, r
T
k,t + 1 and bank loan le,t. The bank loan cannot exceed the
value of their capital. Entrepreneurs pay banks a return Re,t on the loan. Similar to
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994), we assume that investment uses the same goods
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composite as the consumption basket. φk2
(
∆kNt
)2
and φk2
(
∆kTt
)2
are convex capital
adjustment costs that entrepreneurs face when they change their stock of capital in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors. Entrepreneurs’ first order conditions are:
1
ce,t
(1 + φk∆k
N
t ) =
λ′e,t
ce,t
me + βeEt
{
1
ce,t+1
[(rNk,t+1 + 1− δ) + φk∆kNt+1]
}
, (14)
1
ce,t
(1 + φk∆k
T
t ) =
λ′e,t
ce,t
me + βeEt
{
1
ce,t+1
[(rTk,t+1 + 1− δ) + φk∆kTt+1]
}
, (15)
1
ce,t
=
λ′e,t
ce,t
+ βeEt
(
Re,t+1
ce,t+1
)
. (16)
where λ′e,t/ce,t is the Lagrangian multiplier of entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint. For-
eign entrepreneurs’ problems and first order conditions are similar.
1.3.5 Bankers
Domestic Bankers: Domestic bankers borrow from domestic depositors and for-
eign banks and supply loans to impatient HHs and entrepreneurs. The funds they obtain
from the foreign bank is in units of tradable goods. They pay returns on the funds they
borrow, Rd,t and Rf,t, to depositors and foreign banks respectively. They charge higher
interests on the loans they lend out: Ri,t and Re,t to impatient HHs and entrepreneurs.
They face a capital requirement constraint and a collateral debt constraint. The two
constraints together pin down the level of foreign assets in the model. Their optimiza-
tion problem is:
9
max
cb,t,dt,li,t,le,t,lf,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtb ln cb,t,
subject to the budget constraint:
cb,t +Rd,tdt−1 + le,t + li,t +Rf,tpTt lf,t−1
= dt +Re,tle,t−1 +Ri,tli,t−1 + pTt lf,t−{
φe
2
(∆le,t)
2 +
φi
2
(∆li,t)
2 +
φd
2
(∆dt)
2 +
φf
2
∆(pTt lf,t)
2
}
, (17)
the capital requirement constraint:
dt + p
T
t lf,t ≤ γele,t + γili,t, (18)
and the foreign debt constraint:
pTt lf,t ≤ mf
(
li,t + le,t − dt
Rf,t
)
. (19)
The international inter-bank loan lf,t is denominated in tradable good price. In do-
mestic consumption good unit, its value is pTt lf,t. Domestic bankers use their capital
as collateral, which is equal to total assets li,t + le,t minus liability dt. Ali Dib (2010)
made a similar assumption on the interbank lending constraint. mf is the loan to value
in the international financial market. φe2 (∆le,t)
2, φi2 (∆li,t)
2, φd2 (∆dt)
2,
φf
2 (∆p
T
t lf,t)
2 are
adjustment costs that banks face when they change their loans and deposits. Their first
order conditions are:
1
cb,t
[1− φd∆dt] =
λ′b,t
cb,t
+
λ′f,t
cb,t
mf + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[Rd,t+1 − φd∆dt+1]
}
, (20)
1
cb,t
[1 + φi∆li,t] =
λ′b,t
cb,t
γi +
λ′f,t
cb,t
mf + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[Ri,t+1 + φi∆li,t+1]
}
, (21)
1
cb,t
[1 + φe∆le,t] =
λ′b,t
cb,t
γe +
λ′f,t
cb,t
mf + βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[Re,t+1 + φe∆le,t+1]
}
, (22)
1
cb,t
[
1− φf∆
(
pTt lf,t
)]
=
λ′b,t
cb,t
+
λ′f,t
cb,t
Rf,t
+ βbEt
{
1
cb,t+1
[
Rf,t+1
pTt+1
pTt
− φf∆
(
pTt+1lf,t+1
)]}
. (23)
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where λ′b,t and λ
′
f,t are multipliers on the capital requirement and foreign debt con-
straints, multiplied by banker consumptions. The intuition here is similar to that of
Iacoviellow (2010), with one exception, the presence of λ′f,t. To increase one unit of
consumption today, bankers can either increase one unit of today’s deposit or today’s
inter-bank loan (today’s liabilities), or reduce one unit of today’s consumers’ loan or
business loan (today’s assets). If he, for example, chooses to increase dt, re-arranging
the equations gives:
1− λ′b,t − λ′f,tmf − φd∆dt = Et
{
βb
cb,t
cb,t+1
[Rd,t+1 − φd∆dt+1]
}
.
The right hand side of the equation is the cost of increasing one unit of deposit this pe-
riod, which is equal to the additional return tomorrow that bankers have to pay on the
deposit, less the lower cost that bankers pay on adjustment cost tomorrow, discounted
into today value by bankers’s stochastic discount factor
{
βb
cb,t
cb,t+1
}
. The left hand side
is the marginal benefit of consuming one more unit today, minus the cost of tightening
capital requirement constraint, λ′b,t, minus the cost of tightening foreign debt constraint,
λ′f,tmf , minus the adjustment cost in changing deposit that bankers face today. A simi-
lar argument holds if bankers choose, instead, to increase foreign loans or decrease loans
made to domestic borrowers.
Foreign Bankers: Foreign bankers borrow the fund from foreign depositors and
supply loans to foreign impatient HHs and entrepreneurs. Foreign banks also lend to
domestic banks in the form of tradable goods. They only face budget constraint and
capital requirement constraint. They are subject to the endowment shock t. Their
maximization problem is:
11
max
c∗b,t,d
∗
t ,l
∗
i,t,l
∗
e,t,lf,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
(β∗b )
t ln c∗b,t,
subject to the budget constraint:
c∗b,t +R
∗
d,td
∗
t−1 + l
∗
e,t + l
∗
i,t + p
T∗
t lf,t
= d∗t +R
∗
e,tl
∗
e,t−1 +R
∗
i,tl
∗
i,t−1 +Rf,tp
T∗
t lf,t−1 − ∗t
−
{
φe
2
(∆l∗e,t)
2 +
φi
2
(∆l∗i,t)
2 +
φd
2
(∆d∗t )
2 +
φf
2
∆(pT∗t lf,t)
2
}
, (24)
and the capital requirement constraint:
d∗t ≤ γel∗e,t + γil∗i,t + γfpT∗t lf,t. (25)
Their first order conditions are similar to those of domestic banks without the multiplier
on the foreign debt constraint λ′f,t. When foreign banks increase their consumption
by increasing deposits or reducing loans, only their capital requirement constraint is
tightened.
1.3.6 Firms
Firms in the tradable and nontradable sectors use labor from HHs and capital from
entrepreneurs to produce tradable and nontradable goods. They pay wages to HHs and
capital rental fees to entrepreneurs. Their maximization problem is
max
kjt−1,n
j
p,t,n
j
i,t
pijt = p
j
ty
j
t − rjk,tkjt−1 − wjp,tnjp,t − wji,tnji,t
subject to yjt = z
j
t (k
j
t−1)
α
[
(njp,t)
1−σ(nji,t)
σ
]1−α
,
where j = T,N . The Cobb-Douglas aggregate of labor is to control for the economic
size of patient and impatient HHs in the economy, as in Iacoviello (2005 and 2010). The
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higher σ is, the larger the size of impatient HHs vs. patient HHs. The Cobb-Douglas
aggregate is used, instead of a simple linear combination, to pin down the steady state
labor supply to each sector. In the model with two sectors and two agents, even though
total labor demand in each sector and total labor supply of each type of agents are
determined, a linear aggregate cannot determine what fraction of labor effort of each
agent is allocated to each sector.
1.3.7 Market Clearing Conditions
The housing market clearing conditions are:
hp,t + hi,t = 1,
h∗p,t + h
∗
i,t = 1.
The good market clearing conditions for tradable goods are:
yTt + lf,t =
(
pTt
)−ω [
cp,t + ci,t + ce,t + cb,t + k
N
t + k
T
t − (1− δ)
(
kNt−1 + k
T
t−1
)
+ adjt
]
+Rf,tlf,t−1,
yT,∗t +Rf,tlf,t−1 =
(
pT∗t
)−ω [
c∗p,t + c
∗
i,t + c
∗
e,t + c
∗
b,t + k
N∗
t + k
T∗
t − (1− δ)
(
kN∗t−1 + k
T∗
t−1
)
+ adj∗t
]
+ lf,t,
where adjt (adj
∗
t ) is the sum of all adjustment costs the domestic (foreign) bankers and
entrepreneurs face. The market clearing conditions for non-tradables are implied from
the budget constraints of all agents and the above four market clearing conditions.
1.4 Key Assumptions and Calibration
1.4.1 Key Assumptions
The steady state deposit and lending rates are as followed:
where δ1 =
λ′f (Rf−mf )
(1−βbRd−λ′fmf )(1−γi) and δ2 =
λ′f (Rf−mf )
(1−βbRd−λ′fmf )(1−γe) . Detailed solutions can
be found in the Appendix.
In steady state, foreign banks takes the deposit from foreign savers (patient HHs)
and lend out to foreign impatient HHs, foreign entrepreneurs and domestic banks. In
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Domestic Country Foreign Country
Deposit Rates Rd =
1
βp
R∗d =
1
β∗p
Interbank Rate Rf = (1− γf ) 1β∗b + γfRd
Loan to IHs Ri = Rd +
1
δ1
(Rd −Rf ) R∗i = (1− γi) 1β∗b + γiRd
Loan to Entrepreneur Re = Rd +
1
δ2
(Rd −Rf ) R∗e = (1− γe) 1β∗b + γeRd
order for foreign banks to accept the deposit, the return on deposits that foreign banks
must pay should be ”low enough” for foreign banks. Specifically, 1β∗b
> R∗d =
1
β∗p
, or
foreign bankers are more impatient than foreign depositors. In order for foreign impa-
tient HHs and entrepreneurs to borrow from foreign banks, the interest rates the foreign
banks charge must be ”low enough” for them, or 1β∗e
> R∗e = (1 − γe) 1β∗b + γe
1
β∗p
and
1
β∗i
> R∗i = (1− γi) 1β∗b + γi
1
β∗p
. Foreign entrepreneurs and impatient HHs are more impa-
tient than the weighted average of foreign bankers and foreign depositors. The intuition
here is similar to that of Iacoviello (2010).
In the interbank market, domestic banks borrow from foreign banks because the
funds supplied from foreign banks are cheaper than the funds supplied from domestic
depositors. From the Appendix solution for the multiplier on the interbank borrowing
constraint, one can easily verify that the condition Rf < Rd ensures the binding of the
constraint in steady state. It is equivalent to: (1 − γf ) 1β∗b + γf
1
β∗p
< 1βp , or savers in
domestic country are more impatient than the weighted average of savers and bankers
in the foreign country. For domestic borrowers to accept the rates that the domestic
bank charges, they have to be ”impatient enough” or 1βe > Re and
1
βi
> Ri.
Within the large literature on the global imbalance, to generate the observed
current account in the U.S. and other developing nations, especially China, the common
assumption is the representative agent in the U.S. is more impatient than a representa-
tive in the developing country. To generate the flow of funds at the banking sector level
from the U.S. to EAM, we only assume that the savers in EAM are more impatient than
the weighted average of savers and bankers in the U.S. Other agents in the EAM can be
more patient than the U.S. Thus, our assumption does not contradict the assumption
in the global imbalance literature.
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1.4.2 Calibration
Table 1: Agents Discount Factor
Domestic Agent Discount Factor Value Foreign Agent Discount Factor Value
βp 0.9875 β
∗
p 0.9925
βi 0.95 β
∗
i 0.94
βe 0.95 β
∗
e 0.94
βb 0.96 β
∗
b 0.975
The discount factors for each agent are given by table 1. All these values are
within the range of two standard deviation bands interval (0.91, 0.99) estimated by
Carroll and Samwick (1997). They are chosen according to the key assumptions. The
fraction of impatient HHs σ is 0.5. Campbell and Mankiw (1990) estimated the fraction
of liquidity constrained HHs to be 0.5. Iacoviello (2005 and 2010) set the fraction of
impatient HHs to be 0.36 and 0.3 respectively. Setting σ to be 0.5 is at the upperbound
of the values used in the literature. It gives the convenience of algebraically solving
the model in closed form without changing its fundamentals. Elasticity of substitution
between tradable and non-tradable goods ω is 0.44 as estimated by Stockman and Tesar
(1995). γi, γe are 0.9 as in Iacoviello (2010). We choose γf to be 0.9. Parameters
controlling bankers’ adjustment cost φd, φi, φe, φf are 0.25. Loan to values mi,me,mf
are 0.9, 0.9 and 0.7 respectively. Capital depreciation rate δ is 0.025. The rest of the
model’s parameters are chosen from the closed economy model by Iacoviello (2010)
Table 2: Calibration
Parameter Value Parameter Value
α 0.35 ν 0.08
τp 2 τi 2
φk 2
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Repayment shock
The repayment shock is exogenous. Alternatively, one can endogenize the default
shock as function of the underlying state of the economy. For example, in Forlati and
Lambertini (2011), borrowers default endogenously, when they find that the value of
their collateral is lower than the value of the loan they borrow. Within the context of
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this paper, we treat the repayment shock as exogenous for simplicity and tractability.
A further step, to describe how default can happen endogenously and depend on the
fundamentals of the lending country, and through the banking sector, spread to the
borrowing country, is worthwhile for future investigation.
Figure 10 plots the impulse response results of foreign macroeconomic variables
for the foreign repayment shocks. Default coming from foreign impatient HHs forces the
foreign banks to contract both loans and deposits to maintain their required capital-
asset ratio. The results are a fall in output, asset price, investment, employment and
loan and an increase in lending interest rates. Similar results have been obtained in
Iacoviello’s (2010) closed economy version.
Figure 11 plots the impulse response of international interbank loan and inter-
est rate. When the lending banks from the developed country contract the loan for all
of their borrowers, they do so for the borrowing banks as well.
Figure 12 plots the impulse response results of domestic macroeconomic variables.
When foreign banks contract assets by raising lending rates to maintain their capital
requirement ratio, domestic banks now face more expensive (as Rf increases) and less
available credits (international borrowing constraint tightens when Rf increases), they
have to raise domestic lending rates and reduce the loans made to domestic borrowers.
A domestic credit crunch, characterized by a decrease in loan and an increase in bor-
rowing interest rates has occurred following the default from abroad.
Domestic output, investment and asset prices fall, which are the typical results
following a credit crunch. What is interesting here is the movement of resources across
sectors and the dynamics of the real exchange rate. The international loan is denomi-
nated in tradable goods. When the loans that foreign banks made to domestic banks
suddenly decrease, in the foreign country, the demand for tradable goods decreases and
the price of tradables relative to non-tradables decreases. In the domestic country, the
supply of tradable goods suddenly decreases, which increases the price of tradables rel-
ative to non-tradables. As a result, the real exchange rate decreases on impact. Over
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time, in the domestic country, labor and investment move from the non-tradable to the
tradable sector to equalize the prices in two sectors, exchange rate appreciates toward
its steady state value. Figure 13 plots the impulse responses of real exchange rate and
price of tradable and non-tradable goods in the foreign and domestic countries. Figure
8 documents the real exchange rate movements of Chinese Taipei, India and Korea. The
sharp reduction in the real exchange rate of these countries against the U.S. happened
around the time when U.S. banks substantially deleveraged their balance sheet with
respect to Asia.
Figure 14 plots the impulse responses of repayment shock under different values
of γf . A lower value of γf can be interpreted as banks’ strategy to contract foreign
loans and give priority to long-term domestic borrowers. Peek and Rosengren (1997)
documented this behavior among Japanese banks. It can also be interpreted as a lower
credit rating of the domestic economy. With a smaller γf , the repayment shock generates
much larger volatilities of domestic variables while decreasing the volatilities of foreign
variables. In other words, a lower γf helps mitigate the effects of the financial shock in
the developed country where it originates, while amplifying the effects on the developing
country. The intuition for this comes from foreign banks’ capital requirement constraint:
d∗t ≤ γel∗e,t + γil∗i,t + γfpT∗t lf,t.
Since deposit equals assets minus equity:
l∗i,t + l
∗
e,t + p
T∗
t lf,t − E∗t ≤ γel∗e,t + γil∗i,t + γfpT∗t lf,t,
(1− γe)l∗e,t + (1− γi)l∗i,t + (1− γf )pT∗t lf,t ≤ E∗t . (26)
When default happens and decreases foreign banks’ equity, E∗t , these banks will have to
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decrease the left hand side of the above equation. When γf is smaller than γi, γe, it is
more beneficial for the foreign banks to contract international loans. One unit decrease
in lf,t will loosen the capital requirement constraint by 1 − γf , which is larger than
1 − γe, or 1 − γi, if banks contract business loans, or consumer loans. The adjustment
costs banks face are convex and together with γ will determine how banks contract their
portfolios. Without the convexity in costs, when γf is lower relative to γi and γe, banks
will find it most beneficial to contract foreign loans only.
Devereux and Yetman (2010), using the data for the recent crisis, found that
the magnitude of capital flow from one country to the U.S. depends on the country’s
foreign currency credit rating. A lower rating resulted in a larger capital outflow of the
country to the U.S., following the recent U.S. crisis. A lower rating asset will have a
higher weight in banks’ risk weighted asset (RWA) portfolio in equation 26, or a lower
γf in our model. Thus, the empirical evidence is in line with our model prediction, that
countries perceived as more risky will suffer more from the U.S. crisis than less risky
countries.
1.5.2 γf shock
Permanent Shock
A permanent shock to γf can be interpreted as a change in regulation. A real
world example of this is the change from the Basel I Accord to the Basel II Accord.
Under the Basel I Accord, banks’ assets were classified into categories such as sovereign,
banks, collateral, etc. All debts under the same category carried the same weight in
banks’ RWA and banks were required to hold capital equal to 8% of banks’ total RWA.
For example, all corporate debts had the weight of 100% and all government debts had
the weight of 0%. The Basel II Accord no longer gives the same weight to all assets
in one category if they have a different level of risks. Borrowing banks in developing
countries, if considered risky by Basel II’s new assessment of risk, will have a higher
weight in the lending bank’s RWA.
Figures 15 to 18 have impulse response for a 10% permanent negative shock to γf .
As the international inter-bank loan has a higher weight in the lending banks’ RWA,
lending banks permanently increase the lending rate, Rf , and decrease the amounts of
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loans made to borrowing banks in the developing country, lf . The steady state interbank
lending rate is: Rf =
1
β∗B
−
[
1
β∗B
− 1β∗H
]
γf . When γf decreases, Rf converges to a higher
steady state. The steady state lending rates to domestic borrowers are the weighted
average of interbank lending rate and domestic deposit rate. Thus, they converge to
a new higher steady state. As a result, domestic consumption, output and investment
converge to a lower steady state.
As γf permanently decreases, from equation 25, we see that foreign banks’ capital
requirement constraint tightens. Foreign banks can ”loosen” the constraint by either
deleveraging (reducing the total size of its RWA and deposit) or restructuring its portfo-
lio (holding less assets with high weight and more assets with low weight). The foreign
banks’ adjustment cost helps pin the optimal path for their deposit demand and loan
supply. Contrary to the repayment shock, when the only option is to deleverage, for-
eign banks in this case also restructure their portfolios and hold more assets with lower
weight in their RWA. As a result, foreign deposit goes down (deleverage effect) and loans
to foreign IHs and entrepreneurs go up (portfolio restructuring effect). The foreign in-
vestment, consumption and output go up. New steady state foreign domestic lending
rates, which only depend on foreign banks and patient HHs time preference, stay the
same.
Temporary Shock
Figures 19 to 22 have the impulse responses for the temporary negative shock to
γf . The temporary shock can be interpreted as an exogenous temporary drop in do-
mestic banks’ credit rating. A real world example for this is the drop in domestic bank
credit rating of South Korean banks during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Figure 9
has the graph of credit ratings of nationwide South Korean banks and the South Korean
Won - US Dollar exchange rate. Credit Ratings of major banks in South Korea dropped
significantly before and right at the beginning of the crisis. The results of the impulse
response show a drop in domestic gdp, consumption and investment. The foreign loan
given to domestic banks contracts and interest rate increases. The real exchange rate
also depreciates as a result of tightening foreign credit. This was also the experience of
South Korea during the financial crisis.
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1.6 Relation to empirical facts and existing literature
For the foreign repayment shock, our model generates a drop in output, consump-
tion, investment, loans and housing prices and an increase in bank lending rates in both
home and foreign countries. The borrowing country’s real exchange rate also depre-
ciates. Qualitatively, our model matches the empirical facts. The lowest drop in the
foreign and domestic consumption are 2 ∗ 10−3 and 2 ∗ 10−4, respectively. The drops of
foreign and domestic investment are 5 ∗ 10−3 and 5 ∗ 10−4. The transmission of shock
to the foreign country is just 10%. Quantitatively, our model does not match the mag-
nitude of international transmission observed in data.
Devereux and Yetman (2010) build an international portfolio model to describe
the recent crisis. Leveraged investors in each country holds foreign equity in their port-
folios. The total value of their portfolios has to be greater than a constant times their
equities. When a shock hits the home country and decreases home asset prices, the
value of portfolios of home and foreign investors decreases, forcing them to deleverage.
Eric van Wincoop (2011) build a model with leveraged financial institutions, who in-
vest in both home and foreign assets. The default shock in his model is similar to the
repayment shock in ours. Since foreign financial institutions hold domestic assets, the
domestic default shock damages the foreign bank balance sheet and spreads the crisis
to the foreign country. The main difference between our model and theirs is in our
model, the leveraged domestic bank does not hold foreign asset. In our model, shock
is transmitted through a credit crunch in the interbank loan market. Their models fit
well for the comovement between the U.S. and Europe since European Banking Centers
were the majority foreign holders of U.S. MBS. Our model fits the story between the
U.S. and EAM. EAM were not directly exposed to the U.S. MBS as only 3% of U.S.
ABS are held outside of the U.S., Europe and the Carribean.
Ueda (2010), Kollmann et.al. (2011) and Kalemli-Ozcan et.al. (2011) also build
international business cycle models with leveraged bank(s). In their models, borrowers
in both countries share a common lender(s). When shock hits one country and damages
the balance sheet of the common lender(s), the common lender(s) contract loans in both
countries. In their model, borrowers in one country have direct access to the credit of
the foreign lenders. The story works in the developed world. For EAM, this is not the
case as few borrowers in EAM have direct access to U.S. bank credit. In our model,
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borrowers in EAM only borrow funds from the U.S. through domestic banks. Thus, in
steady state, banks in EAM are net borrowers in our model, which is an empirical fact
and cannot be generated with a model of two symmetric countries.
Another main difference between our model and previous models with leveraged
financial investors (banks) is in our capital requirement (leverage) constraint, we sep-
arate the weights of different assets in the lending bank RWA. Thus, we are able to
investigate the behavior of international transmission of shock when borrowing banks
have different credit rating. We found that when the borrowing economy has a lower
rating, the magnitude of capital that flows back to the U.S. in the crisis is higher. Our
result is consistent with the empirical findings in Devereux and Yetman (2010).
1.7 Conclusion
The recent financial crisis in the U.S. highlights the role that the banking sector
plays in the global macroeconomy. There has been substantial empirical evidence that
suggests financial crisis can be transmitted across borders through the contraction in
cross-border loans in the banking system. The very first empirical papers were written
by Peek and Rosengren (1997 and 2000), who studied the Japanese financial crisis and
its effects on the U.S.. More recent empirical papers study the U.S. financial crisis and
its effects on lending in other countries. Such papers are Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008
and 2009) and Popov and Udell (2010). Our model provides a theoretical framework
to support the hypothesis. When financial shock hits one country, the cross border
inter-bank loan contracts and transmits the shock to another country.
Our paper is also related to a number of papers that study the effects of shocks
to international lending rates on a small open economy. These include Buyukkarabacak
(2008), Christensen et al. (2009) and Faia and Iliopulos (2010). These papers treat the
source of shock as exogenous. Our paper goes one step further and points out that the
lending country’s financial shock could be what is behind the increase in the interna-
tional lending rate. Our paper also differs from other recent papers with leveraged banks
(investors) in three dimensions. First, the shock from the source country is not directly
transmitted by damaging the foreign banks’ balance sheet, but rather, from contracting
the loan in the interbank market. This helps apply our model for EAM, which were
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not directly exposed to the U.S. MBS. Second, borrowers in one country do not borrow
directly from foreign banks, but through domestic banks. Thus, in the steady state, at
the banking level, EAM are net borrowers from the U.S. Third, we separate the weight
of international loans from weights for consumer and business loans in the capital re-
quirement constraint. This helps us investigate the dymanics of the borrowing country
when its banks have different credit ratings and when there is a bank regulation change
in the lending country.
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1.8 Appendix
The steady state equations of domestic and foreign patient HHs’ FOCs for deposits give
the deposit rates: Rd =
1
βp
and R∗d =
1
β∗p
. Foreign banks’ steady state FOCs for deposits
and loans can be written as:
1− β∗bR∗d = λ′∗b ,
1− β∗bR∗i = λ′∗b γ∗i ,
1− β∗bR∗e = λ′∗b γ∗e ,
1− β∗bRf = λ′∗b γ∗f .
where λ′∗b is the multiplier on foreign banks’ capital requirement constraint, multiplied
by foreign bankers’ consumption, i.e., λ′∗b = λ
∗
bc
∗
b,t. Simple algebra, replacing λ
′∗
b with
(1 − β∗bR∗d), then yields the foreign banks’ lending rates. Domestic banks’ steady state
FOCs for deposits and loans are:
1− βbRd = λ′b + λ′fmf ,
1− βbRi = λ′bγi + λ′fmf ,
1− βbRe = λ′bγe + λ′fmf ,
1− βbRf = λ′b + λ′fRf .
From the first and the last equation of the above system of four equations, one can solve
for the value of λf :
λ′f =
βb(Rd−Rf )
Rf−mf .
The bottom of the equation is greater than 0, since Rf > 1 > mf . Thus, λf > 0 when
Rd > Rf . Combining the above system of equations to solve for domestic lending rates,
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we have
Rf −Rd
Ri −Rd =
λ′f (mf −Rf )
λ′b(1− γi)
,
Rf −Rd
Ri −Rd =
λ′f (mf −Rf )
(1− βbRd − λ′fmf )(1− γi)
= −δ1,
Ri = Rd +
1
δ1
(Rd −Rf ).
Rf −Rd
Re −Rd =
λ′f (mf −Rf )
λ′b(1− γe)
,
Rf −Rd
Re −Rd =
λ′f (mf −Rf )
(1− βbRd − λ′fmf )(1− γe)
= −δ2,
Re = Rd +
1
δ2
(Rd −Rf ).
All deposit and lending rates are now determined.
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Impulse Response: Foreign repayment shock
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Impulse Response: Permanent Shock to γf
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Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
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Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
34
Figure 21:
Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
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Impulse Response: Temporary Shock to γf
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Chapter 2: Equity Home Bias and Consumption-
Real Exchange Rate Puzzles: A Joint Solution
2.10 Abstract
In a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a complete
asset market, home agents should hold a foreign equity biased portfolio to hedge the
non-traded labor income risk, which contradicts home equity biased portfolios observed
worldwide. As the labor income share increases, the degree of home bias should decrease
because there is more incentive to hold foreign equity. In the data, there is not any evi-
dence that the labor income share and the degree of home bias are negatively correlated.
The standard model also predicts that the consumption differential-real exchange rate
correlation is positive, while it is negative in the data. I show that a combination of mar-
ket incompleteness, non-tradable goods and labor supply can explain the three features
above. My model can generate a large equity home bias, despite the strong positive cor-
relation of non-traded human capital return with domestic equity return. The home bias
is not sensitive to the labor income share. The consumption differential-real exchange
rate unconditional correlation generated by my model simulation is zero.
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2.11 Introduction
To diversify risks, investors in country n, who consume a fraction µn of the
world’s output, should buy the same fraction µn of global financial assets, (Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1996)). However, investors all over the world hold mostly home equities in their
portfolios. Table 1 illustrates the degrees of home equity bias for selected countries.1
Following Ahearne et al. (2004) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2011), home equity bias is
defined as:
EHBi = 1− Share of Foreign Equities in Country i Equity Holdings
Share of Foreign Equities in the World Market Portfolio
Table 1: Home Equity Bias for Selected Countries in 2011
Country Domestic Market Share of Portfolio in Degree of Equity
in % of World Market Domestic Equity in % Home Bias
Capitalization = EHBi
United States 33.0 74.6 0.62
Canada 4.0 71.7 0.70
Germany 2.5 47.5 0.46
United Kingdom 6.6 62.8 0.60
Australia 2.6 76.8 0.76
Japan 7.0 79.5 0.78
Baxter and Jermann (1997) point out that since non-traded human capital return
can be highly correlated with domestic equity return, the optimal portfolio should be
foreign biased, which makes the puzzle ”worse than you think.” A standard dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model predicts that home investors should hold
mostly foreign equity. In addition, the fraction of domestic equity in home portfolios
should depend on the fraction of labor income share in home GDP. The larger the labor
income share is, the less domestic equity home investors should hold, or the smaller the
degree of home equity bias. This is not the case in the data. Figure 1 plots the degree of
home equity bias against labor income shares across OECD countries in 2005. Figures
2 and 3 graph labor income shares and the degree of home equity bias over time for
selected countries. The data suggests that there is not a negative relation between labor
1Data source: World Federation of Exchanges and CPIS.
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income shares and the degree of home equity bias.
The early literature on international portfolios that tried to explain the observed
level of home bias is based on endowment economy models without labor income. Such
models are in Tesar (1993), Baxter, Jermann and King (1998), Pesenti and van Wincoop
(2002), Collards et al. (2009) and etc. With an endowment economy, one can avoid the
tendency of labor income to generate a foreign biased portfolio. Although endowment
economy models help build our initial foundation for the understanding of optimal in-
ternational portfolios, they ignore half of the puzzle.
The world wide increase of asset trade in the last two decades, together with its
importance in the global transmission of shocks has generated renewed interest in un-
derstanding international portfolios in a DSGE context. Tille and van Wincoop (2010),
Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2012) developed methods
to solve for optimal international portfolios in DSGE models. Matsumoto (2007), Heath-
cote and Perri (2008), Engel and Matsumoto (2009), Coeurdacier et al. (2009 and 2010)
are among those who applied these methods in a complete market framework. Mat-
sumoto (2007) builds an international portfolio model with tradable and non-tradable
sectors. He assumes complete markets, and the stocks in both sectors are traded in-
ternationally. He finds that the optimal portfolio depends on parameters’ values. A
very foreign biased portfolio of stocks in the non-tradable sector is needed to generate
equity home bias in the portfolio of stocks in the tradable sector. In the data, how-
ever, the degree of equity home bias in the non-tradable sector is much higher relative
to that of the tradable sector (see Kang and Stulz (1997), Denis and Huizinga (2004),
Hnatkovska (2010)). Heathcote and Perri (2008) generate home bias with capital ac-
cumulation. This results in a pro-cyclical investment expenditure and counter-cyclical
dividends. Thus, home equity is perfectly negatively correlated with home labor in-
come, which makes it useful to hedge labor income risk. However, labor income and
dividend payment are positively correlated in the data for G7 countries, casting doubt
on Heathcote and Perri’s key mechanism for generating equity home bias (Coeurdacier
et at. (2010)). Engel and Matsumoto (2009) show that a forward position in the foreign
exchange market can ensure perfect risk sharing with nominal rigidity. Thus, a com-
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plete market equilibrium can be achieved even with an equity home biased portfolio.
However, the implied long position of home investors on domestic bond contradicts the
fact that the U.S appears short on the dollar and long on foreign exchange (Obstfeld
(2007)). Tille and van Wincoop (2010) use cost in asset trade to generate equity home
bias. Fitzgerald’s (2012) empirical tests find that the null hypothesis of frictionless asset
markets within developed countries cannot be rejected. Coeurdacier et al. (2009) use
redistributive shocks and ”iPod” shocks. Such shocks are of debatable and need more
micro-foundation (Ghironi (2007)). Coeurdacier et al. (2010) explain home bias with
investment efficiency shocks.
International portfolio models that assume market incompleteness include Pe-
senti and van Wincoop (2002), Hnatkovska (2010) and Feng (2012). Pesenti and van
Wincoop (2002) build a portfolio balance, endowment economy model where stocks of
the non-tradable endowment are not traded. They obtain moments of stock returns and
tradable and non-tradable consumptions, and they conclude that the optimal portfolio
should be slightly home biased. Hnatkovska (2010) builds a DSGE model with simi-
lar assumptions. In her model, bias in consumption of tradable goods generates home
bias. When home non-tradable consumption increases above foreign, home demand for
tradable goods increases. Since home consumption of tradable goods consists of largely
home goods, home agents should hold home equity in the tradable sector to hedge non-
tradable sector technology shocks. The findings of these papers suggest that market
incompleteness could be an answer to the international portfolio puzzle. However, it is
uncertain whether their results still hold when the labor income is present. In addition,
it is complicated, if not yet possible, for one to extend their models to include labor
income in a standard DSGE framework. The numerical method used to solve for dy-
namic portfolio choice in Hnatkovska (2010) relies critically on the closed form solution
for dynamic portfolio holdings given conditional means and variance of returns, which
was developed by Campbell, Chan and Viceira (2003). With labor income, this method
does not yield a closed form solution for portfolio holdings (Viceira (2001) and Camp-
bell and Viceira (2003)). Feng (2012) builds a model that can generate home equity
bias with incomplete market, endogeneous labor supply and taste shock. She solves for
the optimal portfolio that depends on the covariance of labor income and taste shock
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with foreign equity excess return. With the correlation measured from data, a home
equity bias portfolio is implied. However, it is unclear whether the model generate a
high positive correlation between home equity return and home labor income. To see
why this is the case, log linearize the consumption, leisure first order conditions to get:
τˆt + wˆt − ρCˆt = κLˆt, where τt, wt, Ct and Lt are taste shock, wage, consumption and
labor supply. κ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. For simplicity,
assume further that labor is inelastically supplied and therefore κ = 0, the equation
becomes: τˆt + wˆt − ρCˆt = 0. Thus, when a positive taste shock hits, wage tends to be
negatively correlated with consumption, and consequently, negatively correlated with
domestic equity return. Since it is unclear whether the model generates a strong pos-
itive correlation between domestic equity return and human capital return in a DSGE
setting, it is unclear whether the model has solved the puzzle identified by Baxter and
Jermann (1997).
In this paper, I extend the work by Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) and Hnatkovska
(2010) and include a production economy. The percentage of home equity held in the
home portfolio of stocks in the tradable sector generated by my model is 94%, despite
a 64% labor income share in the GDP and the strongly positive unconditional corre-
lation of human capital return and equity return. The optimal portfolio is insensitive
to the change in the labor income share. In addition, the unconditional correlation of
consumption differential and real exchange rate is zero.
In my model, market incompleteness and non-tradable goods tilt home portfolio
toward home equity. When the market is incomplete, home agents cannot fully insure
againt non-tradable sector relative technology shock. When favorable non-tradable sec-
tor relative technology shock hits, home non-tradable consumption is high and therefore,
home marginal utility of tradables is high, due to the complementary relationship be-
tween the two goods. At the same time, labor mobility across sectors increases home
tradable output, making home tradable sector equity a good asset to hedge non-tradable
sector relative technology shocks. When labor income is a negligible part of GDP, it is
intuitive that home agents will hold a home biased portfolio of tradable sector equity, as
seen in Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) and Hnatkovska (2010). As labor income share
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increases, on the one hand home agents would like to hold more foreign equity to hedge
the positive correlation of home equity return and labor income. On the other hand,
as capital share decreases, home agents need more home equity to hedge non-tradable
sector relative technology shocks. The change in the degree of home bias when the labor
income share increases is small, which is what we observe in the data.
This paper is also related to the literature on the consumption differential-real ex-
change rate correlation puzzle. In a standard complete market framework, consumption
differential and real exchange rates between two countries should be perfectly positively
correlated (Backus and Smith (1993)). This is not the case in the data since the cor-
relation is low and often negative. Figures 5 and 6 graph the consumption differential
and real exchange rate for the last 37 years between the U.S. and U.K., and the U.S.
and Japan. Table 2 reports the correlation between the two series.2
Table 2: Consumption Differential and Real Exchange Rate Correlation
Cor(CDt , RERt) Cor(∆C
D
t ,∆RERt)
US-UK -0.33 -0.17
US-JPN 0.42 0.39
Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) show that with an incomplete market, tradable
sector technology shocks generate a strong negative consumption differential-real ex-
change rate correlation while non-tradable sector technology shocks generate a strong
positive correlation. The model is convincing if one believes that tradable sector tech-
nology shocks are the prevailing source of fluctuation. The model can generate a low
consumption-real exchange rate correlation when the tradable sector productivity shocks
are seven times more volatile and three times more persistent than the non-tradable sec-
tor. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) generate a negative consumption differential-real
exchange rate in line with data using highly persistent shocks perfectly correlated across
sectors.
In my model, I investigate the consumption differential-real exchange rate puz-
2Data is from the World Bank. The HP filter parameter is 6.25 as in Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for
annual data
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zle jointly with the home equity bias puzzle. Doing so helps me identify one channel
that can generate low correlation that has not been identified before. Following trad-
able sector relative technology shocks, the correlation between consumption and real
exchange rate is negative, which is similar to the results in the previous literature. Fol-
lowing non-tradable sector relative technology shocks, home non-tradable consumption,
and therefore tradable consumption, rise above foreign. Since the home portfolio does
not contain enough home equity to support such an increase in consumption, home
agents have to spend a fraction of their permanent wealth. Thus, in subsequent peri-
ods when home wealth deteriorate, home consumption decays at much faster rate than
other variables in the model, including the real exchange rate. The results with non-
tradable sector productivity shocks are different to those found in previous literature,
which usually find that non-tradable technology shocks generate perfect correlation be-
tween consumption differential and real exchange rate. The unconditional consumption
differential-real exchange rate in my model is close to zero with more convincing shock
processes.
2.12 Model
The model framework is built upon Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2009) and Dev-
ereux and Sutherland (2010). I use Devereux and Sutherland’s (2011) solution method
to solve for the optimal portfolio. There are two symmetric countries, each has size
1/2, with tradable and non-tradable sectors. Following Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002)
and Hnatkovska (2010), I assume market incompleteness, and equities of firms in the
non-tradable sector are not traded internationally (see Kang and Stulz (1997), Denis
and Huizinga (2004), and Hnatkovska (2010) for empirical evidence). Prices are flexi-
ble and labor is endogenous and mobile across sectors. Shocks are log AR(1), sectoral
technology shocks and uncorrelated across countries and sectors.
The basket of tradable goods consumed at home is given by:
CTt =
[(
1
2
) 1
ω
(CHt )
ω−1
ω +
(
1
2
) 1
ω
(CFt )
ω−1
ω
] ω
ω−1
, ω > 0,
where CHt and C
F
t denote consumption sub-baskets consumed at home of both home
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and foreign tradable goods, given by Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates:
CHt =
[
2
1

∫ 1
2
0
cHt (z)
−1
 dz
] 
−1
, CFt =
[
2
1

∫ 1
1
2
cFt (z
∗)
−1
 dz∗
] 
−1
with  > 1.
The corresponding price indexes are:
P Tt =
[
1
2
(PHt )
1−ω +
1
2
(PFt )
1−ω
] 1
1−ω
,
PHt =
[
2
∫ 1
2
0
(PHt (z))
1−dz
] 1
1−
, PFt =
[
2
∫ 1
1
2
(PFt (z
∗))1−dz∗
] 1
1−
.
The non-tradable consumption aggregate and price index are:
CNt =
[∫ 1
0
cNt (z)
−1
 dz
] 
−1
, PNt =
[∫ 1
0
PNt (z)
1−dz
] 1
1−
.
Home agents’ maximization problem is:
maxE0
∑
γt
C
1− 1
σ
t
1− 1σ
− χL
1+ 1
ϕ
t
1 + 1ϕ
 , σ > 0, ϕ > 0.
I follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) and assume endogenous discount factors that
follow the following process:
γt+1 = γtβ(C
T
At)
−η/(CTA)
−η, η > 0,
where CTAt and C
T
A are country aggregate tradable good consumption at time t and its
initial symmetric steady state. Agents take γt as exogeneous and do not internalize
the impact of their consumption on the discount factor. Consumption is an aggregate
of tradable and non-tradable consumption: Ct =
[
a
1
θ (CTt )
θ−1
θ + (1− a) 1θ (CNt )
θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
,
θ > 0. The parameter a controls for the relative size of tradable and non-tradable
sectors. The budget constraints in units of tradable consumption baskets is given by:
CTt + p
N
t C
N
t + α1t + α2t = r1tα1t−1 + r2tα2t−1 + d
T
t + d
N
t + wtLt,
where pNt is the price of the basket of non-tradables in terms of tradables (i.e. p
N
t =
PNt /P
T
t ). α1t and α2t are home real holdings of domestic and foreign tradable equities.
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r1t and r2t are returns on home and foreign equities in the tradable sector. d
T
t and
dNt are dividends of home tradable and non-tradable sectors. wt is the wage and Lt is
the total labor supply. The problem for foreign agents is similar. Foreign variables are
denoted with asterisks.
The first-order conditions for home agents are:
C
1
θ
− 1
σ
t a
1
θ
(CTt )
1
θ
= λt, (1)
C
1
θ
− 1
σ
t (1− a)
1
θ
(CNt )
1
θ
= pNt λt, (2)
χL
1
ϕ
t = wtλt, (3)
λt =
γt+1
γt
Et [βλt+1r1t+1] , (4)
λt =
γt+1
γt
Et [βλt+1r2t+1] , (5)
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier of the budget constraint. The discount factor at
t+ 1 is known at time t and appears outside the expectation operator.
Firm z’s production is linear in labor and is given by:
yjt (z) = Z
j
tL
j
t (z), j = T,N,
where yt(z)
T , yNt (z), Lt(z)
T and LNt (z) are the outputs and labor demands of individual
firms in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. ZTt and Z
N
t are technologies in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors and their log deviations from steady state, zˆTt+1 and
zˆNt+1, follow AR(1) processes as follows:zˆTt+1 − zˆT∗t+1
zˆNt+1 − zˆN∗t+1
 =
ρT 0
0 ρN

 zˆTt − zˆT∗t
zˆNt − zˆN∗t
+
eTt+1
eNt+1
 , (6)
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where eTt and e
N
t are jointly normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix:
Et

eTt+1
eNt+1
[eTt+1 eNt+1]
 =
 (σT )2 COV (eTt+1, eNt+1)
COV (eTt+1, e
N
t+1) (σ
N )2
 (7)
= (σN )2
 ı ρTN√ı
ρTN
√
ı 1
 . (8)
σT , σN , ρTN are standard deviations and correlation of eTt and e
N
t . ı is the variance
ratio of the two shocks. Firm revenues are distributed as labor income and dividends.
Firms’ profit maximizing behaviors yield the following conditions for dividends, prices,
and labor incomes:
dt(z)
j =
pt(z)
jyt(z)
j

, pt(z)
j =

− 1
wjt
Zjt
,
wtLt(z)
j = pt(z)
jyt(z)
j − 1

, j = T,N,
where prices are in units of the tradable consumption basket. Aggregate over tradable
and non-tradable sectors to get the total dividends, prices and labor income payments
in each sector:
djt =
pjty
j
t

pjt =

− 1
wt
Zjt
wtL
j
t = p
j
ty
j
t
− 1

j = T,N
2.13 Solving for the optimal portfolio
Combining equations (4) and (5) from the consumers’ first-order conditions, we
have:
Et
C 1θ− 1σt
(CTt )
1
θ
r1t+1
 = Et
C 1θ− 1σt
(CTt )
1
θ
r2t+1
 .
Denote xˆt the log deviation of variable xt from its steady state. To solve for
the optimal portfolio, I follow Devereux and Sutherland (2011) and take a second-
order Taylor expansion of the above equation around the steady state, which yields the
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following equation:
Et
[
rˆxt+1 +
1
2
(
rˆ21t+1 − rˆ22t+1
)− 1
θ
CˆTt+1rˆxt+1 +
(
1
θ
− 1
σ
)
Cˆt+1rˆxt+1
]
= 0 + 0(3)
0(3) is a residual which contains all terms of order higher than two, which can
be ignored in a second-order approximation. rxt is the return differential between home
and foreign stocks: rxt ≡ r1t− r2t and rˆxt ≡ rˆ1t+1− rˆ2t+1. Applying a similar procedure
to the foreign first-order conditions gives us:
Et
[
rˆxt+1 +
1
2
(
rˆ21t+1 − rˆ22t+1
)− 1
θ
CˆT∗t+1rˆxt+1 +
(
1
θ
− 1
σ
)
Cˆ∗t+1rˆxt+1
]
= 0 + 0(3)
One can rearrange the above two equations to get the following equations:
Et
[{
−1
θ
(CˆTt+1 − CˆT∗t+1) +
(
1
θ
− 1
σ
)
(Cˆt+1 − Cˆ∗t+1)
}
rˆxt+1
]
= 0 + 0(3) (9)
Et[rˆxt+1] = Et
[
−1
2
(
rˆ21t+1 − rˆ22t+1
)
+
1
2θ
(CˆTt+1 + Cˆ
T∗
t+1)rˆxt+1 −
1
2
(
1
θ
− 1
σ
)
(Cˆt+1 + Cˆ
∗
t+1)rˆxt+1
]
+ 0(3)
(10)
Equation (6) is the portfolio optimality condition. Note that when the size of
the non-tradable sector is zero, and Ct+1 = C
T
t+1, we get the equation in Devereux
and Sutherland (2011): Et[(Cˆt+1 − Cˆ∗t+1)rˆxt+1] = 0. Equation (7) indicates that up to
first-order approximation, Et[rˆxt+1] = 0. This is the same result as in Devereux and
Sutherland (2011).
Define Wt = α1t+α2t to be total net claims of home agents on the foreign country
at the end of period t (i.e. the net foreign assets of home agents). The log deviation of Wt
is defined as: Wˆt = (Wt−W¯ )/pHyT , where W¯ , pH and yT are initial steady state values
of home net foreign assets, tradable price and tradable output respectively. Let α¯ =
α1/βp
T yT . Combining home and foreign budget constraints, first-order conditions for
asset holdings and shock processes, one can derive the dynamics of tradable consumption
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differentials and net foreign assets:3
Wˆt =
1
β
Wˆt−1 + α¯rˆx,t +
1
2
[
(AB − E)(zˆTt − zˆT∗t )− (G−AC)(CˆTt − CˆT∗t )− (AD − F )(zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
]
,
(8)
(1− ξ)i (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
1− ρT
1− ξ − ρT
[
(1− ξ)i − (ρT )i] I(zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− 1− ρ
N
1− ξ − ρN
[
(1− ξ)i − (ρN )i]K(zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) = Et [CˆTt+1 − CˆT∗t+1] , ∀i ≥ 0, , (9)
where
A =
(1− ω)

+
− 1

1
a
[
1 + ϕ− ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
]
− (− 1)

(1− θ) 1− a
a
,
B =
σa(ω − 1)
ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωa+ θ(1− a)) ,
D =
σ(1− a)(1− θ) + ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωa+ θ(1− a)) ,
F =
[
− 1
a
ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
+
− 1

1− a
a
(1− θ)
]
,
I =
(σ − θ)(ω − 1)a(1− a)
ϕ+ ωa+ θ(1− a) + (1− a) (σ − θ)(1− a)
ξ =
ση
1 + C(1− a)(σ − θ) .
C =
ϕ+ σ(1− a)
ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωa+ θ(1− a)) ,
E =
1

(1− ω),
G =
[
− 1
a
ϕ
σ
+ 1 +
1− a
a
− 1

]
,
K =
(σ − θ)(1− a) [σ(1− a) + σωa+ ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)]]
σ [ϕ+ ωa+ θ(1− a) + (1− a)(σ − θ)(1− a)] ,
Without the non-tradable sector, a = 1, I = 0 and K = 0. When the sta-
tionary inducing device is removed, η = 0 and equation 8 becomes: (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) =
Et
[
CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i
]
, ∀i ≥ 0. The consumption differential is a random walk that jumps
immediately to its long-run level on the impact of shocks, which is the same result as
in Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2009) and Devereux and Sutherland (2010). We can com-
bine equation (8), equation (9) and the no-Ponzi condition to solve for the on-impact
tradable consumption differential, (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ), as a function of technology shocks:4
CˆTt − CˆT∗t =
2[1− β(1− ξ)]Wˆt
β [(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
+
1− β(1− ξ)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C][{
2α¯(1− β)(1− ω)
(
(B − 1) + Iβ(1− ρ
T )C
1− β(1− ξ)
)
+ (AB − E)− Iβ(1− ρ
T )
1− β(1− ξ)(G−AC)
}
(zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
(1− βρT )
−
{
2α¯(1− β)(1− ω)
(
D +
Kβ(1− ρN )C
1− β(1− ξ)
)
+ (AD − F )− Kβ(1− ρ
N )
1− β(1− ξ)(G−AC)
}
(zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
(1− βρN )
]
.
(10)
3Detailed derivations are given in Appendix A2 and A3.
4Detailed derivations are given in Appendix A4.
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With the solution for (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ), and hence the dynamics of (CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i) according
to equation (9), we can solve for the on-impact return differential:5
rˆxt =
(1− β)(1− ω)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
{
[(B − 1)(G−AC) + C(AB − E)] e
T
t
1− βρT
− [D(G−AC) + C(AD − F )] e
N
t
1− βρN
}
. (11)
Without the non-tradable sector, a = 1 and the solution for the return differential
coincides with the results in Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2009):6
rˆxt =
σ(1 + ϕ)(1− β)(ω − 1)
(1− βρ) [ϕ(ω − 1) + σ(ϕ+ ω)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)ϕ]e
T
t .
When a = 1 and ϕ = 0, or labor is inelastically supplied, the return differential is:
rˆxt =
1− β
1− βρ
[
(ω − 1)eTt
ω
]
,
which is similar to the solution found in Devereux and Sutherland (2010).7 Combining
equations (6), (10) and (11) gives the solution for α1 :
α1 =
βpy
2(1− ω)(1− β)
−
{
Ψ1Ω1ı
(1−βρT )2 +
Ψ2Ω2
(1−βρN )2
}
+
{
(Ψ1Ω2+Ψ2Ω1)ρTN
√
i
(1−βρT )(1−βρN )
}
{
Φ1Ω1ı
(1−βρT )2 +
Φ2Ω2
(1−βρN )2
}
−
{
(Φ1Ω2+Φ2Ω1)ρTN
√
i
(1−βρT )(1−βρN )
} ,
where p and y are steady state relative price and output of home tradable sector in units
of tradable consumption basket, and:
Φ1 == B − 1− IC 1− β
1− β(1− ξ) , Φ2 = D −KC
1− β
1− β(1− ξ) ,
Ψ1 = (AB − E) + I(G−AC) 1− β
1− β(1− ξ) , Ψ2 = (AD − F ) +K(G−AC)
1− β
1− β(1− ξ) ,
Ω1 = (B − 1)(G−AC) + C(AB − E), Ω2 = D(G−AC) + C(AD − F ).
The total value of home equity in the tradable sector is βpy/((1− β)). Therefore, the
proportion of home equity in the tradable sector held by home households, δT , is given
5Detailed derivations are given in Appendix A5.
6The solution coincides with the case in Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2009) when the government
expenditure is zero and countries are symmetric.
7In my model, innovation to the dividend differential at time t when a = 1 and ϕ = 0 is (ω−1)eTt /ω.
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by:
δT =
βpy
(1−β) + α1
βpy
(1−β)
= 1 +
 1
2(1− ω)
−
{
Ψ1Ω1ı
(1−βρT )2 +
Ψ2Ω2
(1−βρN )2
}
+
{
(Ψ1Ω2+Ψ2Ω1)ρTN
√
i
(1−βρT )(1−βρN )
}
{
Φ1Ω1ı
(1−βρT )2 +
Φ2Ω2
(1−βρN )2
}
−
{
(Φ1Ω2+Φ2Ω1)ρTN
√
i
(1−βρT )(1−βρN )
}
 .
2.14 Return to human capital
In order to calculate the return to human capital, I suppose that each agent in
each country can trade the claim on the human capital to other agents of the same
country. The human capital is defined as:8
Ht =
∞∑
i=0
βiwt+i+1.
The return on such claim is thus:
rht =
Ht + wt
Ht−1
.
In equilibrium, every agent in one country will hold the same amount of human capital:
H it = H
j
t , ∀i, j in the same country. Therefore, H it = Hjt = 0. The innovation to the
human capital return differential can be expressed as:9
rˆhxt − Et−1[rˆhxt] =
(1− β)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]{
[B(G−AC)− C2α¯(1− β)(1− ω) + C(AB − E)] e
T
t
1− βρT
− [D(G−AC) + C(AD − F )] e
N
t
1− βρN
}
, (12)
where rˆhxt = rˆ
h
t − rˆh∗t .
2.15 The optimal portfolios
2.15.1 Benchmark calibration
I pick  = 2.8, which implies that the labor income share is 64% of the total output.
I pick the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradables ω = 1.8. Backus,
8Since the elasticity of the discount factor with respect to consumption is extremely small, η = 0.001,
the result is not much different from defining human capital as the summation of the stream of wage
income discounted by γt
9detailed derivations are given in Appendix A6
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Kehoe and Kydland (1994) estimate this parameter in the neighborhood of 1.5. Lai and
Trefler (2002) estimate it to be 12 from disaggregated data. Similar to Tesar (1993),
the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods is θ = 0.44. I
assume the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) 1/σ = 0.2. The usual value of
CRRA used in the business cycle literature is 1 or 2. However, there are empirical papers
that estimate much lower values. Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985) estimate
1/σ to be in the range of 0.09 and 0.51. Amano and Wirjanto (1994) estimate 1/σ
can be as low as 0.124. Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) find it to be 0.02. Thus, the
value of 1/σ = 0.2 is still within the range found in the empirical literature. I pick a
to be 0.3, which approximately corresponds to the trade volume of the U.S in 2011.10
The discount factor is set to 0.95, corresponding to the annual return of 5%. Following
King and Rebelo (1999) and Ghironi, Lee and Rebucci (2009), the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply is ϕ = 4. The autocorrelation coefficient of shocks is ρT = ρN = 0.99.
Ireland (2001) estimates technology shock autocorrelation coefficient and find values as
high as 0.9983 for quarterly data, corresponding to the value of 0.993 for annual data
. The variance ratio of tradable and non-tradable sector relative technology shocks is
1.4 in Stockman and Tesar (2003), 2.5 in Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2008) and 7.2
in Benigno and Thoenissen (2008). I set the variance ratio ı = 4, which is within the
range of the estimated. The corresponding correlation of shocks are 0.35, 0.01 and 0.34
in these papers respectively. I set the correlation of shocks to be 0.25.
2.15.2 Complete market
There are two assets in the model: the home and foreign equities of the tradable
sector. The financial market is complete when there are only two shocks: home and
foreign tradable sector technology shocks. This is the case when either the size of the
non-tradable sector is 0, or the non-tradable sector relative technology shock variance
is zeros.
Complete market without the non-tradable sector:
When the size of the non-tradable sector is 0, a = 1 and the proportion of home
10Trade data from Bureau of Economic Analysis. GDP data from IMF
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equity held by home households becomes: δT = 1−/2. The solution coincides with Ghi-
roni, Lee and Rebucci (2009) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011).11 When  = 2.8, 64%
of output is distributed toward labor income, the optimal portfolio is δT = δTCM1 = −0.4,
and home agents should short sell home equity. This solution also coincides with Baxter
and Jermann (1997). A foreign biased portfolio is optimal to hedge non-traded labor
income risk.
Complete market with the non-tradable sector and non-tradable sector rel-
ative technology shock variance is zero:
When σN = 0, ı = ∞, the optimal portfolio is δT = δTCM2 = −0.59 given the
benchmark calibration for the rest of the parameters. The optimal portfolio in this case
consists of slightly less home equity compared to the case of complete market without
non-tradable goods. The intuition is in figure 6, which shows the impulse responses
when the tradable sector relative technology shock hits. When the non-tradable sector
is present, favorable home tradable sector relative technology shock raises home pro-
ductivity in the tradable sector. High home wage in the home tradable sector draws a
fraction of home labor in the non-tradable sector toward the tradable sector, decreasing
home non-tradable output and consumption. Home tradable consumption decreases on
impact relative to foreign to equalize to marginal utility of tradable consumption across
countries. Thus, home agents should hold less home equity because the on-impact
consumption in this case is smaller, relative to the case of complete market without
non-tradable goods. The total consumption differential is highly correlated with the
real exchange rate, which is consistent with the prediction of Backus and Smith (1993).
The optimal portfolio as a function of labor share:
The blue and green lines in figure 7 show the relationship between δT and labor
income share. When the financial market is complete, the optimal portfolios are highly
negatively correlated with labor income share. When the labor share increases, home
11The solution without the non-tradable sector coincides with the special case of Devereux and Suther-
land (2011) when capital is perfectly correlated with labor income.
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agents need more foreign equities to hedge the home non-traded labor income risk. Thus,
the optimal portfolio δT consists of less home equity.
2.15.3 Incomplete Market
With the presence of the non-tradable sector and non-tradable sector relative
technology shocks, the financial market is incomplete. The optimal portfolio, given the
benchmark parameters, consists of 94% home equity, despite that labor income accounts
for 64% of output and domestic human capital return is highly correlated with domestic
equity return. In my model, the unconditional correlation of (rˆxt+1 − Et[rˆxt+1]) and(
rˆhxt+1 − Et[rˆhxt+1]
)
generated by the simulation is 0.77.
The optimal portfolio as a function of labor share:
The red line in figure 7 show the relationship between δT and the labor income
share for the case of incomplete market. The change of δT is small when the labor
income share changes.
What generates home bias and its insensitivity to the change in the labor
income share?
When the labor income share = 0, my model generates home biased equity port-
folios, which are the vertical intercept of the red line in figure 7. When the labor income
share = 0, the result is intuitive, given the incomplete financial market and the com-
plimentary relationship between tradable and non-tradable goods, as also observed in
Pesenti and van Wincoop (2002) and Hnatkovska (2010). When the financial market is
incomplete, home agents cannot fully insure against non-tradable sector relative tech-
nology shocks. When the home non-tradable sector relative technology shock hits and
home non-tradable output and consumption increases, home marginal utility of trad-
able consumption is high since tradable and non-tradable goods are complements. The
mobile labor market generates output co-movement across sectors, increasing the home
tradable sector equity return. Home tradable sector equity is therefore a desirable asset
to hedge home non-tradable sector relative technology shocks.
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When the labor income share increases, on one hand, home agents would like to
hold more foreign equity of the tradable sector to hedge the positive correlation between
domestic equity return and labor income generated by tradable sector relative technology
shocks. On the other hand, as capital share decreases, more tradable sector equity is
needed to provide the same claim of a fraction of tradable output. As a result, home
agents have incentive to hold more home equity to hedge non-tradable sector relative
technology shocks. The incentives to hedge tradable and non-tradable sector relative
technology shocks pull home bias in opposite directions. Consequently, the change in
home bias is small when the labor income share changes.
2.15.4 The optimal portfolio as a function of the size of the tradable sector
Figure 8 shows the optimal portfolio δT as a function of the size of the tradable
sector a. The horizontal asymptote is at δT = δTCM1 = −0.4. When a = 1, we have the
optimal portfolio of the complete market case without the non-tradable sector. To gain
an intuition on why δT decreases when a increases, log linearize equation (1):
CˆTt
[
a(σ − θ)− σ
θσ
]
+ CˆNt
[
(1− a)(σ − θ)
θσ
]
= λˆt.
The left hand side is the log-linear of home agents’ marginal utility of tradable con-
sumption. The higher a, the larger a(σ − θ) − σ)/(θσ) and the more impact a given
deviation of tradable consumption, CˆTt , has on marginal utility of tradable consump-
tion. Thus, the tradable consumption risk increases. Similarly, the higher a, the smaller
(1−a)(σ− θ))/(θσ) and the less impact a given deviation of non-tradable consumption,
CˆNt , has on marginal utility of tradable consumption. Thus, the non-tradable consump-
tion risk decreases. Consequently, home agents hold more foreign equity because the
incentive to hedge tradable sector relative technology shocks is dominant.
2.15.5 The optimal portfolio as a function of the variance ratio
Figure 9 shows the optimal portfolio δT as a function of the variance ratio ı. The
optimal portfolio decreases as ı increases. When ı increases, the non-tradable sector rel-
ative technology shock variance becomes smaller, relative to that of the tradable sector.
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Home agents then tilt their portfolios toward foreign equity to hedge the tradable sector
relative technology shocks. The horizontal asymptote is at δT = δTCM2 = −0.59. When
ı approaches ∞, the non-tradable sector relative technology shock variance becomes in-
finitesimally small relative to that of the tradable sector, and δT approaches the optimal
portfolio of the case of the complete market with the non-tradable sector.
2.15.6 The optimal portfolio as a function of σ and ω
Figure 10 shows the optimal portfolio δT as a function of σ and ω. Keeping σ
constant, δT increases as ω decreases. The closer ω is to 1, the more volatile the term of
trade is and the more risk-sharing it provides when tradable sector relative productivity
shocks hit. Thus, the tradable sector risk becomes smaller and home agents hold a
more home biased portfolio. This result is similar to Cole and Obtsfeld (1991). Keeping
ω constant, δT increases as σ increases. The intuition also comes from the log-linear
version of the marginal utility of tradable consumption:
CˆTt
[
a(σ − θ)− σ
θσ
]
+ CˆNt
[
(1− a)(σ − θ)
θσ
]
= λˆt,
or
CˆTt
[
a(σ − θ)− σ
θσ
]
+ CˆNt (1− a)
[
1
θ
− 1
σ
]
= λˆt.
The smaller σ is, the more impact a given deviation CˆNt has on the marginal utility
of tradable consumption. Thus, the smaller σ, the ”riskier” the non-tradable sector
relative productivity shocks are, and a more home biased portfolio is needed to hedge
these shocks.
2.16 Macroeconomics dynamics and consumption differential-real ex-
change rate correlation
2.16.1 Tradable sector relative technology shock
Figure 11 shows the impulse responses when the tradable sector relative technology
shock hits. Higher home technology increases the the on-impact equity return differen-
tial. Subsequent equity return differentials are 0, as indicated by equation (7). Higher
home productivity in the tradable sector increases the home wage above foreign. Home
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agents, enjoying higher labor income and portfolio income, increase their consumptions
and asset position. The relative price of non-tradable goods, which depends on relative
wage, also jumps. Since the tradable consumption baskets are the same in both coun-
tries, the real exchange rate only depends on the relative price of non-tradables. Thus,
the real exchange rate drops on impact. The total consumption differential and real
exchange rate move in opposite directions following tradable sector relative technology
shocks.
2.16.2 Non-tradable sector relative technology shock
Figure 12 shows the impulse responses when the non-tradable sector relative tech-
nology shock hits. Due to higher home productivity in the non-tradable sector, home
non-tradable output and consumptions increase above foreign. Thus, home tradable
and total consumptions also increase above foreign on impact. However, since the op-
timal portfolio does not fully insure against the non-tradable sector relative technology
shocks, home agents have to spend their permanent wealth to support the higher home
consumptions on-impact and few periods thereafter. The home net foreign asset posi-
tion deteriorates. With less wealth, home agents in the long-run have to consume less
and supply more labor at a lower wage, keeping the relative price of non-tradables at
a lower level. Therefore, the real exchange rate is higher in the long-run. The total
consumption differential and the real exchange rate move in opposite directions in the
long run.
2.16.3 Simulation and consumption differential-Real exchange rate corre-
lation
I generates two series of shocks eTt and e
N
t for 100 periods. The shocks are drawn
from normal distribution with variance covariance matrix described in section 3. I then
feed the shocks to the model and generate the time series for variables of the model. I
HP-filter these series with smoothing parameter λ = 6.25, and calculate the correlation
of the cyclical components of the consumption differential and the real exchange rate.
I repeat the process 1000 times and take the average correlation. The unconditional
correlation generates by my model is 0.
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Figure 13 shows the unconditional correlation of consumption differential-Real ex-
change rate for different values of σ and ω. Keeping σ constant, the correlation changes
little when ω changes. When ω increases, the term of trade is less volatile and pro-
vides less risk-sharing. Thus, for a given optimal portfolio, the volatility generated by
tradable sector relative technology shocks is higher, which tends to decrease the uncon-
ditional correlation. However, as ω increases, the optimal portfolio becomes less home
biased, the jump in consumption differential due to higher home wealth generated by
favorable tradable productivity shocks becomes smaller. Thus, the volatility generated
by the non-tradable sector dominates, which increases the unconditional correlation. As
a result, the correlation changes little when ω changes. Keeping ω constant, when σ
increases, the correlation becomes more negative. As σ increases, the portfolio becomes
more home biased and the volatilities generated by tradable sector relative technology
shocks are larger, which decreases the correlation.
Figure 14 shows the unconditional correlation of consumption differential-Real
exchange rate for different values of δT and ω. δT in this case is not calculated from
the model but rather, given exogenously. As one can see, for higher values of ω, keeping
ω fixed, the unconditional correlation greatly differs with different values of the steady
state portfolio. Previous literature only consider the implied unconditional correlation
of consumption differential-real exchange rate for given shock processes and conclude
that such model and shock processes can generate a correlation that matches data.
However, it is possible that the steady state portfolio implied by such shock processes
will change the correlation. Thus, by jointly incorporating the home equity bias puzzle
and the Backus Smith puzzle, not only do I generate a home equity biased portfolio, I
also convincingly generate a low consumption differential-real exchange rate correlation.
2.17 Conclusion
My paper has been written to explain two features of the international equity
home bias puzzle. First, the equity home bias exists in every country world-wide, de-
spite the non-traded labor income that implies optimal foreign biased portfolio. Second,
the equity home bias is not negatively correlated with the fraction of labor income,
which is the implication in a standard model when the labor income and equity return
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are positively correlated. My model generates a large home equity biased portfolio, de-
spite the presence of non-traded human capital and the strongly positive correlation of
its return with domestic equity return.
My model also generates a zero unconditional correlation of consumption differential-
real exchange rate. I finds that the correlation depends on the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, 1/σ, and elasticity of substitution between home and foreign tradable goods,
ω. Keeping σ constant, the correlation change little when ω changes. Keeping ω con-
stant, the correlation decreases when 1/σ decreases. Previous literature consider the
Backus-Smith puzzle in an incomplete market setting without jointly solve for the op-
timal portfolio. I show that the steady state portfolio can greatly change the result of
the correlation. It is possible that a given model and shock processes that can generate
the consumption differential-real exchange rate correlation that matches data, but once
consider the optimal portfolio implied by such shocks, the correlation can be greatly
different. By jointly consider the two puzzles together, I can convincingly prove that
with my model, shock processes, and the optimal portfolio implied by the model can
generate a low correlation.
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2.18 Appendix
A1: The model in steady state
In the steady state, pT = pT∗ = pN = pN∗ = p = 1, yT = yT∗ = y = CT = CT∗ =
LT = LT∗ = a, CH = CF = CH∗ = CF∗ = a2 , y
N = CN = yN∗ = CN∗ = LN = LN∗ =
1− a, w = w∗ = −1 , dT = dT∗ = a , r1 = r2 = 1β , rx = 0, W = W ∗ = 0.
A2: Derivation for equation (8)
From the definition of Wt, we have Wt = −W ∗t and Wˆt = −Wˆ ∗t . Combining the
log-linear version of the home and foreign budget constraints gives:
2Wˆt = 2α¯rˆx,t +
2
β
Wˆt−1 +
1

(
dˆTt − dˆT∗t
)
+
Lw
py
(wˆt − wˆ∗t )−
CT
py
(
CˆTt − CˆT∗t
)
− − 1

pNCN
py
[(
CˆNt − CˆN∗t
)
+
(
pˆNt − pˆN∗t
)]
.
We will express variable differentials as functions of technology, tradable consumption
and wage differentials. From the consumer first-order conditions for consumption, equa-
tion (1) and (2), and the firm optimal pricing equation in the non-tradable sector, we
have: 1θ (Cˆ
T
t − CˆNt ) = pˆNt = wˆt − zˆNt . Thus, non-tradable consumption and price differ-
entials can be written as:
CˆNt − CˆN∗t =
(
CˆTt − CˆT∗t
)
− θ [(wˆt − wˆ∗t )− (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )] ,
pˆNt − pˆN∗t = (wˆt − wˆ∗t )−
(
zˆNt − zˆN∗t
)
.
Log linearizing the firm optimal pricing equation in the tradable sector gives the equation
for the term of trade (TOT): ˆTOT t = pˆ
T
t − pˆT∗t = (wˆt − wˆ∗t ) −
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)
. Demands
for home tradable goods from home and foreign households are: CHt =
1
2(p
T
t )
−ωCTt and
CH∗t =
1
2(p
T
t )
−ωCT∗t respectively. Market clearing condition for home tradable goods
ensures: yTt = C
H
t + C
H∗
t . Combining the three equations above with equations for
firms’ dividends and prices, one can express the tradable sector dividend and output
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differentials as functions of tradable sector technology and wage differentials:
dˆTt − dˆT∗t = (1− ω)
[
(wˆt − wˆ∗t )− (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
]
,
yˆTt − yˆT∗t = −ω
[
(wˆt − wˆ∗t )−
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)]
.
Combining first-order conditions for tradable consumption and leisure, one can derive
labor supply differential as a function of consumption, wage and non-tradable sector
technology differentials:
Lˆt − Lˆ∗t = −
ϕ
σ
(CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) + ϕ
(
1− (σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
)
(wˆt − wˆ∗t ) +
ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
(zˆNt − zˆN∗t ).
We can now express Wˆt as function of technology, wage and tradable consumption
differentials:
2Wˆt =
2
β
Wˆt−1 + 2α¯rˆx,t +
[
(1− ω)

+
Lw
py
(
1 + ϕ− ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
)
− (− 1)

(1− θ)pNCN
py
]
(wˆt − wˆ∗t )
− 1

(1− ω)(zˆTt − zˆT∗t ) +
(
Lw
py
ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
+
− 1

pNCN
py
(1− θ)
)
(zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
−
(
Lw
py
ϕ
σ
+
CT + pNS −1
py
)
(CˆTt − CˆT∗t ).
To further solve for the dynamics, we need to solve for the wage differential. The wage
differential is determined from the labor supply and demand equations. The total labor
demand is the sum of labor demands in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. The
labor demand equation is:
Lˆt − Lˆ∗t =
LT
L
{−ω [(wˆt − wˆ∗t )− (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )]− (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )}
+
LN
L
{(
CˆTt − CˆT∗t
)
− θ [(wˆt − wˆ∗t )− (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )]− (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )} .
Combining labor demand and labor supply equations, we can solve for wage differential
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as a function of tradable consumption and technology differentials:
wˆt − wˆ∗t =
ϕL+ σLN
ϕL [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωLT + θLN )(Cˆ
T
t − CˆT∗t )
+
σLT (ω − 1)
ϕL [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωLT + θLN )
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)
+
σLN (θ − 1)− ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)L
ϕL [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωLT + θLN )
(
zˆNt − zˆN∗t
)
.
Plug the equation for wage differential into the equation for Wˆt, one can express the
dynamics of net foreign assets as a function of tradable consumption and technology
differentials:
2Wˆt =
2
β
Wˆt−1 + 2α¯rˆx,t +
[
(1− ω)

+
Lw
py
(
1 + ϕ− ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
)
− (− 1)

(1− θ)pNCN
py
]
[
ϕL+ σLN
ϕL (σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)) + σ(ωLT + θLN )(Cˆ
T
t − CˆT∗t )
+
σLT (ω − 1)
ϕL (σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)) + σ(ωLT + θLN )
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)
− σL
N (1− θ)
ϕL (σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)) + σ(ωLT + θLN )
(
zˆNt − zˆN∗t
)]
− 1

(1− ω)(zˆTt − zˆT∗t ) +
(
Lw
py
ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
+
− 1

pNCN
py
(1− θ)
)
(zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
−
(
Lw
py
ϕ
σ
+
CT + pNS −1
py
)
(CˆTt − CˆT∗t ).
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Let:
A =
(1− ω)

+
Lw
py
[
1 + ϕ− ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
]
− (− 1)

(1− θ)pNS
py
=
(1− ω)

+
− 1

1
a
[
1 + ϕ− ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
]
− (− 1)

(1− θ)1− a
a
,
B =
σLT (ω − 1)
ϕL [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωLT + θLN )
=
σa(ω − 1)
ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωa+ θ(1− a)) ,
C =
ϕL+ σLN
ϕL [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωLT + θLN )
=
ϕ+ σ(1− a)
ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωa+ θ(1− a)) ,
D =
σLN (1− θ) + ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)L
ϕL [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωLT + θLN )
=
σ(1− a)(1− θ) + ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)] + σ(ωa+ θ(1− a)) ,
E =
1

(1− ω)
F =
[
Lw
py
ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
+
− 1

pNS
py
(1− θ)
]
=
[
− 1
a
ϕ(σ − θ)(1− a)
σ
+
− 1

1− a
a
(1− θ)
]
,
G =
[
Lw
py
ϕ
σ
+
CT + psS −1
py
]
=
[
− 1
a
ϕ
σ
+ 1 +
1− a
a
− 1

]
.
A,B,C,D,F,G are simply constants which depend on parameters. One can rewrite Wˆt
as:
2Wˆt =
2
β
Wˆt−1 + 2α¯rˆx,t +A
[
B(zˆTt − zˆT∗t ) + C(CˆTt − CˆT∗t )−D(zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
]
− E(zˆTt − zˆT∗t ) + F (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )−G(CˆTt − CˆT∗t ).
Dividing both sides by 2, we can get equation (8).
A3: Derivation for equation (9)
The total consumption differential can be written as a function of tradable and
non-tradable consumption differentials. Substitute the non-tradable consumption dif-
ferential with the function of wage and technology differentials, we can get the following
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equation for the total consumption differential:
Cˆt − Cˆ∗t =
(
CˆTt − CˆT∗t
)
− (1− a)θ [(wˆt − wˆ∗t )− (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )] .
From Appendix A2, the wage differential can be written as:
wˆt − wˆ∗t = C
(
CˆTt − CˆT∗t
)
+B
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)−D (zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) .
Combining the above two equations with the log-linear version of equation (1) and
equation (4), shock processes and the discount factor process, one can get:
(1− ξ) (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) + (1− ρT )I
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)− (1− ρN )K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
= Et
[
(CˆTt+1 − CˆT∗t+1)
]
,
where:
I =
(σ − θ)(ω − 1)a(1− a)
ϕ+ ωa+ θ(1− a) + (1− a) (σ − θ)(1− a) ,
K =
(σ − θ)(1− a) [σ(1− a) + σωa+ ϕ [σ − (σ − θ)(1− a)]]
σ [ϕ+ ωa+ θ(1− a) + (1− a)(σ − θ)(1− a)] ,
ξ =
ση
1 + C(1− a)(σ − θ) .
The general formula is
(1− ξ)i (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
1− ρT
1− ξ − ρT
[
(1− ξ)i − (ρT )i] I (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− 1− ρ
N
1− ξ − ρN
[
(1− ξ)i − (ρN )i]K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) = Et [(CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i)] .
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We prove it by induction. The statement is true for i = 1, since the general formula
simply becomes:
(1− ξ) (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) + (1− ρT )I
(
zˆTt − zˆT∗t
)− (1− ρN )K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
= Et
[
(CˆTt+1 − CˆT∗t+1)
]
,
which is shown above. Suppose the statement is true for i = n, and we have:
(1− ξ)n (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
1− ρT
1− ξ − ρT
[
(1− ξ)n − (ρT )n] I (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− 1− ρ
N
1− ξ − ρN
[
(1− ξ)n − (ρN )n]K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) = Et [(CˆTt+n − CˆT∗t+n)] .
We will show that the statement is true for i = n + 1. The first order condition for
period t+ n yields:
Et
[
(1− ξ) (CˆTt+n − CˆT∗t+n) + (1− ρT )I
(
zˆTt+n − zˆT∗t+n
)− (1− ρN )K (zˆNt+n − zˆN∗t+n)]
= Et
[
CˆTt+n+1 − CˆT∗t+n+1
]
We use the assumption that the statement is true for i = n and substitute Et
[
(CˆTt+n − CˆT∗t+n)
]
with:
(1− ξ)n (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
1− ρT
1− ξ − ρT
[
(1− ξ)n − (ρT )n] I (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− 1− ρ
N
1− ξ − ρN
[
(1− ξ)n − (ρN )n]K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) .
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We also use the fact that Et[zˆ
j
t+n − zˆj∗t+n] = (ρj)n(zˆjt − zˆj∗t ), j = T,N :
(1− ξ)
[
(1− ξ)n (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
1− ρT
1− ξ − ρT
[
(1− ξ)n − (ρT )n] I (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− 1− ρ
N
1− ξ − ρN
[
(1− ξ)n − (ρN )n]K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t )]+ (1− ρT )(ρT )nI (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− (1− ρN )(ρN )nK (zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) = Et [CˆTt+n+1 − CˆT∗t+n+1]
The above equation can be easily reduced to:
(1− ξ)n+1 (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
1− ρT
1− ξ − ρT
[
(1− ξ)n+1 − (ρT )n+1] I (zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
− 1− ρ
N
1− ξ − ρN
[
(1− ξ)n+1 − (ρN )n+1]K (zˆNt − zˆN∗t ) = Et [CˆTt+n+1 − CˆT∗t+n+1]
Thus, the statement is true for i = n + 1 and hence, our proof for the general formula
for consumption dynamics.
A4: Derivation for equation (10)
In order to solve for the on-impact tradable consumption differential, we need
to solve for the on-impact return differential as a function of tradable consumption and
technology differentials. We start from the basic equation for the return of home assets:
r1t =
dTt + Z1t
Z1t−1
,
where Z1t is the price of the home assets in period t. The log-linear version of the above
equation is:
rˆ1t = (1− β)dˆTt + βZˆ1t − Zˆ1t−1.
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The same equations holds for subsequent period returns:
βrˆ1t+1 = β(1− β)dˆTt+1 + β2Zˆ1t+1 − βZˆ1t,
...etc.
Summing up all of the equations for returns of home asset gives:
rˆ1t = (1− β)
[
dˆTt + βdˆ
T
t+1 + ...
]
− Zˆ1t−1.
Since the same equation applies for the returns of foreign assets, the return differential
at time t is given by:
rˆxt = (1− β)Et
[
(dˆTt − dˆT∗t ) + β(dˆTt+1 − dˆT∗t+1) + ...
]
−
(
Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1
)
.
Replacing dividend differential with wage and technology differentials into the above
equation gives:
rˆxt = (1− β)Et
[
(dˆTt − dˆT∗t ) + β(dˆTt+1 − dˆT∗t+1) + β2(dˆTt+2 − dˆT∗t+2) + ...
]
−
(
Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1
)
,
= (1− β)(1− ω)
∞∑
i=0
βiEt
[
(wˆt+i − wˆ∗t+i)− (zˆTt+i − zˆT∗t+i)
]− (Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1) ,
= (1− β)(1− ω)
[
B − 1
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t ) +
∞∑
i=0
βiEtC(Cˆ
T
t+i − CˆT∗t+i)−
D
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t )
]
−
(
Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1
)
.
From equation (8):
(G−AC)(CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) =
2
β
Wˆt−1 − 2Wˆt + 2α¯rˆxt + (AB − E)(zˆTt − zˆT∗t )− (AD − F )(zˆNt − zˆN∗t ).
Similar equations hold for subsequent periods. Therefore:
∞∑
i=0
(G−AC)βiEt(CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i) =
2
β
Wˆt−1 + 2α¯rˆxt +
AB − E
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t )−
AD − F
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t ).
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We use the no-Ponzi condition in the above summation. Plugging the equation for the
on-impact return differential into the equation above gives:
∞∑
i=0
(G−AC)βiEt(CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i) =
2
β
Wˆt−1
+ 2α¯
{
(1− β)(1− ω)
{
B − 1
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t ) + C
∞∑
i=0
βiEt(Cˆ
T
t+i − CˆT∗t+i)−
D
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t )
}}
+
AB − E
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t )−
AD − F
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t ).
From equation (9) that we prove in Appendix A3, we can express
∑∞
i=0 β
iEt(Cˆ
T
t+i−CˆT∗t+i)
as function of (CˆTt − CˆT∗t ):
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i) =
CˆTt − CˆT∗t
1− β(1− ξ) +
β(1− ρT )
[1− β(1− ξ)][1− βρT ]I(zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t )
− β(1− ρ
N )
[1− β(1− ξ)][1− βρN ]K(zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t ).
Combining the two equations above, we can get equation (10).
A5: Derivation for equation (11)
From the equation for return differential proved in Appendix A3, we have:
rˆxt = (1− β)(1− ω)
{
B − 1
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t ) + C
∞∑
i=0
βiEt(Cˆ
T
t+i − CˆT∗t+i)
− D
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t )
}
−
(
Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1
)
,
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Similar to the step use in Appendix A4, substitute
∑∞
i=0 β
iEt(Cˆ
T
t+i − CˆT∗t+i) with time t
tradable consumption and technology differentials:
rˆxt = (1− β)(1− ω)
{
B − 1
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t ) + C
∞∑
i=0
βiEt(Cˆ
T
t+i − CˆT∗t+i)−
D
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t )
}
− (Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1),
= (1− β)(1− ω)
{
B − 1
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t ) +
C
1− β(1− ξ)
{
(CˆTt − CˆT∗t ) +
β(1− ρT )
(1− βρT )It −
β(1− ρN )
(1− βρN )Kt
}
− D
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t )
}
− (Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1),
= (1− β)(1− ω)
{
B − 1
1− βρT (zˆ
T
t − zˆT∗t ) +
C
[1− β(1− ξ)]
2[1− β(1− ξ)]Wˆt−1
β [(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
+
C
[1− β(1− ξ)]
1− β(1− ξ)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
[{
2α¯(1− β)(1− ω) B − 1
1− βρT +
AB − E
1− βρT
}
(zˆTt − zˆT∗t )
−
{
2α¯(1− β)(1− ω) D
1− βρN +
AD − F
1− βρN
}
(zˆNt − zˆN∗t )
]
− D
1− βρN (zˆ
N
t − zˆN∗t )
}
− (Zˆ1t−1 − Zˆ2t−1).
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We use the trick rˆxt = rˆxt −Et−1[rˆxt] to get rid of terms containing Wt−1 and (Zˆ1t−1 −
Zˆ2t−1) and (zˆ
j
t − zˆj∗t ), i = T,N
rˆxt = (1− β)(1− ω)
{
(B − 1) eˆ
T
t
1− βρT
+
C
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
[
{2α¯(1− β)(1− ω)(B − 1) + (AB − E)} eˆ
T
t
1− βρT
−{2α¯(1− β)(1− ω)D + (AD − F )} eˆ
N
t
1− βρN
]
−D eˆ
N
t
1− βρN
}
=
(1− β)(1− ω)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
{
(B − 1) [(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C] eˆ
T
t
1− βρT
+C
[
{2α¯(1− β)(1− ω)(B − 1) + (AB − E)} eˆ
T
t
1− βρT
−{2α¯(1− β)(1− ω)D + (AD − F )} eˆ
N
t
1− βρN
]
−D [(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C] eˆ
N
t
1− βρN
}
=
(1− β)(1− ω)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
{
[(B − 1)(G−AC) + C(AB − E)] eˆ
T
t
1− βρT
− [D(G−AC) + C(AD − F )] eˆ
N
t
1− βρN
}
This is equation (11).
A4: Derivation for equation (12)
The steady state values are r¯h =
1
β and H¯ =
βw
1−β . One can log-linear the definition
of human capital and its return:
(Et − Et−1)Hˆt = (1− β)
β
∞∑
i=0
βi(Et − Et−1)wˆt+1+i
(Et − Et−1)rˆht = (1− β)(Et − Et−1)wˆt + β(Et − Et−1)Hˆt
Innovation to return to human capital can then be expressed as innovation to wages:
(Et − Et−1)rˆht = (1− β)
∞∑
i=0
βi(Et − Et−1)[wˆt+i]
(Et − Et−1)(rˆht − rˆ∗ht) = (1− β)
∞∑
i=0
βi(Et − Et−1)
(
wˆt+i − wˆ∗t+i
)
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We previously showed that wˆt+i−wˆ∗t+i = B∗(zˆTt+i−zˆT∗t+i)+C(CˆTt+i−CˆT∗t+i)−D∗(zˆNt+i−zˆN∗t+i).
Substitute in to find the formula for rˆhxt = rˆht − rˆ∗ht:
(Et − Et−1)rˆhxt = (1− β)(Et − Et−1)
∞∑
i=0
βi
{
B(zˆTt+i − zˆT∗t+i) + C(CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i)−D(zˆNt+i − zˆN∗t+i)
}
= (1− β)
{
B
1− βρT e
T
t + (Et − Et−1)C
∞∑
i=0
βi(CˆTt+i − CˆT∗t+i)−
D
1− βρN e
N
t
}
= (1− β)
{
B
1− βρT e
T
t + C
{
(Et − Et−1)[CˆTt − CˆT∗t ]
1− β + Ie
T
t
β(1− ρT )
(1− β)(1− βρT )−
KeNt
β(1− ρN )
(1− β)(1− βρN )
}
− D
1− βρN e
T
t
}
= (1− β)
{
B
1− βρT e
T
t
+
C
1− β
1− β
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]
[{
2α¯(1− β)(1− ω) B − 1
1− βρT +
AB − E
1− βρT
}
eTt
−
{
2α¯(1− β)(1− ω) D
1− βρN +
AD − F
1− βρN
}
eNt
]
− D
1− βρN e
N
t
}
.
Innovation to human capital return differential becomes:
rˆhxt − Et−1[rˆhxt] =
(1− β)
[(G−AC)− 2α¯(1− ω)(1− β)C]{
[B(G−AC)− C2α¯(1− β)(1− ω) + C(AB − E)] e
T
t
1− βρT
− [D(G−AC) + C(AD − F )] e
N
t
1− βρN
}
,
which is equation (12) in the model.
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2.19 Figures
Figure 1: Labor Income Share and Equity Home Bias 2007
Data from OECD and Sercu and Vanpee (2007)
Figure 2: Labor Income Share Over Time
Data from OECD
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Figure 3: Home Equity Bias Over Time
Home bias calculated from data from CPIS and World Federation of Exchange
Figure 4: Real Exchange Rate and Relative Consumption for USA and GBR
Annual data from World Bank. Both series are logged and HP-filtered using the smoothing parameter
λ = 6.25
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Figure 5: Real Exchange Rate and Relative Consumption for USA and JPN
Annual data from World Bank. Both series are logged and HP-filtered using the smoothing parameter
λ = 6.25
Figure 6: Complete market impulse responses, tradable sector relative technology shock
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Figure 7: Optimal portfolio and labor share
Figure 8: Optimal portfolio and the size of the tradable sector
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Figure 9: Optimal portfolio and variance ratio of relative technology shocks
Figure 10: Optimal portfolio as function of σ and ω
74
Figure 11: Incomplete market, tradable sector relative technology shock
Figure 12: Incomplete market, non-tradable sector relative technology shock
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Figure 13: Unconditional correlation of consumption differential-Real exchange rate as
function of σ and ω
Figure 14: Unconditional correlation of consumption differential-Real exchange rate as
function of δT and ω
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